

Report

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Mozambique – IMD: End-Term Outcome Measurement Report

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AR	Assembly of Republic
AP	Provincial Assembly
CEMI	Center for Mediterranean and International Studies
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
IMD	Instituto for Multiparty Democracy
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
PoD	<i>Power of Dialogue</i>
AMwA	Akina Mama wa Africa
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
FDC	Foundation for Community Development
MASC	Civil Society Support Mechanism Foundation
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance
Frelimo	Mozambique Liberation Front
MDM	Democratic Movement of Mozambique
PODEMOS	Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique
GRIP	Gender Road Map for Inclusive Political Parties
FM	Women Forum
APM	Women Political Academy
AMCS	Association of women on Social Communication
FAMODE	Forum of Mozambican Associations of People with Disabilities
OMD	Mozambican Observatory for Disability
MEPT	Education for All Movement
AMODEFA	Mozambican Association for Family Development
PwD	People with Disabilities
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
L&A	Lobbying & Advocacy
ROSC	Civil Society Forum for Children's Right
CESC	Center for Learning and Capacity Building of Civil Society



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Executive Summary

The Programme Power of Dialogue (PoD) Mozambique is implemented by a Consortium of organizations with the Multiparty Institute for Democracy (IMD) as the lead organization in the country. The Endline Outcome Measurement is aimed to assess the PoD's impact on participation and influence of women and youth in politics in Mozambique. In line with the Theory of Change (ToC), the assessment focused on the four PoD long-term outcomes (LTOs) concerning partner capacity, women's leadership, cross-party trust and democratic space. Its main purpose was to document the extent to which PoD had created change among political and civic actors to advance women's and youth's inclusion in political processes.

The evaluation was conducted in November–December 2025 by an independent consultant, using mixed methods defined in the Terms of Reference. Data collection combined document and literature reviews with primary fieldwork. Quantitative indicators) were supplemented by qualitative evidence and contextual analysis, ensuring a consistent and comprehensive outcome assessment.

Findings by Long-Term Outcome (LTO)

LTO1 – Consortium and CSOs as catalysts of change: The programme markedly strengthened its consortium and partner CSOs. Qualitative evidence shows IMD and allied civil society organizations significantly improved their organizational capacity and legitimacy: for example, IMD led a national Women's Political Agenda and convened high-level multi-party dialogues, demonstrating increased convening power. IMD also diversified its funding and secured follow-on projects, reflecting improved sustainability. In total, PoD trained and engaged far more consortium and CSO members than planned – roughly 40 % above target – creating a broad network of women- and youth-led organisations. In conclusion, PoD exceeded its targets for partner capacity-building, making its partners more effective enablers of change and laying a durable foundation for women's and youth's continued political engagement.

LTO2 – Aspiring women and youth leaders as actors of change: Results show substantial gains in leadership empowerment. By endline about 600 women and 200 young people involved in politics reported feeling able to participate in decision-making, which is close to the defined targets. Politically, PoD advocacy saw tangible breakthroughs: notably, two major opposition parties (Renamo and MDM) each appointed a woman as secretary-general for the first time in 2022, and parties agreed to include women's and youth issues in their electoral platforms. However, broader political shifts tempered concrete gains: women's share in the national assembly slightly fell (from 43 % to 39 % post-2024) due to the emergence of a new party and other factors. PoD nonetheless institutionalised its impact by establishing continuing structures (Women's and Youth Political Academies linked with parties and civil society) to sustain these leadership pipelines. At the endline, women and youth leaders are far better prepared and confident than at baseline; PoD empowered a generation of aspirants, even if measurable changes in elected representation were modest during the project.

LTO3 – Collaboration and trust among civic and political actors: The programme significantly expanded inclusive dialogue, though systemic change remained challenging. The network of engaged organisations grew dramatically – 46 women-led CSOs joined PoD activities by endline, more than double the target of 22. Inter-party dialogue also increased although below the target (13 national multi-party versus 18 targeted). These forums produced concrete collaborative commitments, such as joint inclusive electoral manifestos and a shared Women's Agenda. Nonetheless, comprehensive reforms (e.g. formal gender-parity legislation) remained elusive within the timeframe. While resulting from PoD's implementation the quantity of dialogue processes rose only modestly, their quality improved trust between civil society and political leaders. The existing agreements and coalitions are seen as enduring legacies of increased cooperation, forming a solid base for continued inclusive political practice.

LTO4 – Strengthening democratic space: PoD met its core targets for democratic reform initiatives. All six joint policy proposals aimed at improving the democratic space for women and youth were produced by project end (e.g. draft Gender Parity Law, a National Women's Political Agenda, and recommendations for inclusive election manifestos). The programme also slightly exceeded its advocacy event targets (23 inclusive L&A activities against 21 expected) and convened numerous multi-stakeholder dialogues at national and international levels. The



assessment notes that PoD successfully brought together domestic and international actors to champion democracy, although converting these discussions into formal reforms was slower than hoped. Crucially, PoD created durable platforms: by linking civil society, party and diplomatic stakeholders, it forged a broad coalition for change. These networks and agreements are expected to carry forward PoD's agenda beyond the programme's end. PoD effectively expanded the democratic space by producing targeted reform proposals and building cross-party and international support, even if full policy enactment will require more time. The groundwork laid by these alliances provides a strong basis for future progress.

The Key recommendations following from the PoD outcome analysis are:

- **Support institutional reforms for gender inclusion** – promote legal reforms for gender parity and internal party quotas to secure women's political participation.
- **Deepen and broaden women's leadership paths** – invest in training, mentoring, and networking to help women and youth transition into political leadership roles.
- **Enhance multi-stakeholder dialogue and accountability** – establish regular, inclusive platforms for stakeholders to jointly advance and track inclusion goals.
- **Adapt strategies and safeguard civic space** – flexible approaches for restrictive contexts and advocate for civic freedoms to protect inclusive engagement.
- **Ensure sustainability and local ownership** – funding diversification and long-term planning to empower Mozambican actors to sustain progress independently.



1. Methodology

The Project Power of Dialogue (PoD) objective is ***to contribute to ensure that political and civic actors collaborate, participate and influence the position and involvement of women in political processes in Mozambique*** (IMD, Power of Dialogue, NIMD, 2025). PoD is based on a theory of Change (ToC) consisting of actor-based pathways of change, which hinge on the combination of IMD's experience in politics and the technical assistance and capacity development that will be brought by the Consortium partners to improve its organizational capacities and financial sustainability, to support young and women political and civic leaders to be actors of change, collaborating peacefully on basis of trust, and contributing to strengthen the democratic space.

The project ToC's pathways of change are unfolded in the four long-term outcomes (LTO), namely:

- Outcome 1 (LTO 1) - Consortium, partner networks and local civil society organisations are effective enablers of change
- Outcome 2 (LTO 2) – Aspiring young and women political and civic leaders are influential actors of change
- Outcome 3 (LTO 3) – Political and civic actors collaborate peacefully on a basis of trust
- Outcome 4 (LTO 4) – Political and civic actors strengthen democratic space

The overall objective of the Endline Outcome Assessment *is to measure the Programme's impact on the collaboration, participation and influence of political and civic actors in promoting the involvement of women in political processes in Mozambique* (IMD, Power of Dialogue, NIMD, 2025). In this regard, the Endline Outcome Assessment will focus on the measurement and analysis of the four PoD outcomes to assess its main changes.

The final documentation of the observed changes in the 4 LTOs of the PoD programme was carried out between November and December 2025 by an external consultant, using a mixed methodology, previously determined in the Terms of Reference (TORs), which consisted of document and bibliographic analysis, primary data collection, quantitative and qualitative methods. The research techniques used are described below:

Desk review – a review of project documents and complementary sources of information was carried out for an overview of the implementation and its results, on women's and youth political participation and related issues.

Literature Review – identification of critical elements of youth and women's participation stemming from academic and technical studies, to improve the understanding of the project results. One of the functions of the literature review was to critically analyse the Theory of Change (ToC), thus allowing for a better understanding of the pathways of change, the issues of contribution and attribution of the project to certain results.

Structured and semi-structured interviews with key informants aimed to collecting additional data to complement the desk analysis and fill potential data gaps, and to triangulate information for more analytical consistency. The sampling of key informants was from PoD's management, target groups and beneficiaries. This technique was not activated in the original report writing and was reserved only for report validation purposes. Therefore, all data used are from secondary sources.

These three techniques allowed for the consistent analysis and triangulation of information, producing a solid analysis of the project's impact and providing perspectives on actions based on this exercise. The assessment of the outcomes was based on a set of questions (to be presented in the outcome analysis section) provided in advance as part of the report template.

The data analysis was complemented by contextual interpretation – the consideration of the broader social and political realities in which PoD was implemented – to align findings with the existing political and social dynamics.

1.1. Challenges of the Endline

Some **limitations** affected data collection, analysis and outcome assessment.

Firstly, baseline data gaps – the baseline study (2021) was carried out under constraints for research, due to COVID 2019, which limited the gathering of key data. Therefore, the baseline did not establish clear values for some indicators (especially outcome-level ones). For example, no quantitative baseline existed for Outcome 1



(IMD's organizational sustainability), and baseline values for some intermediate indicators were incomplete (IMD, 2021a). This created challenges in comparing mid-term and end-term progress in some indicators. Secondly, during PoD's first year (2021), M&E systems were still being developed – “owing to the lack of M&E templates there [were] data collection limitations regarding the first year” (IMD, 2023b, p. 5). Some results from 2021 were thus only captured retroactively at mid-term, potentially underestimating baseline achievements. Thirdly, although based on a robust Theory of Change (ToC) and with a systematic documentation of the outcomes, the attribution of the results (or lack of) to the project are challenging (for example, the election and appointment of the representatives of the target group to the relevant positions in the Legislative and Executive branches). Some of the results are likely to be achieved over a longer period that goes beyond the timeframe of the project. To be more accurate, some results reflect more a correlation than a relation of causality. Fourthly, the political context and landscape were challenging and have also changed with the post-electoral social unrests in the 2023 local elections and 2024 national and provincial elections. The latter saw the emergence of a new party and composition of the Parliament and the provincial assemblies changed. Thus, the project has worked for four years (2021-2024) with the three main political parties (Frelimo, Renamo and MDM) that were eventually joined by the new party, PODEMOS, emerging from the 2024 elections as the second most voted. This has implications on following up on the pathways of change based on the work with some of the project target groups, in this case, the political parties. Lastly, tracking multiple indicators, some of them similar (as is the case of indicators 2.1 and 4.1) and with a potential overlap, for multiple years, poses significant challenge of consistency. One notable risk is of double counting the programme outputs, which can contribute to inflate the results.

These challenges were mitigated interpreting the data as much accurate as possible and making explicit caveats on the existing limitations for a nuanced and realistic consideration of the assessment results.

1.2. Structure of the Report

The report is composed of 5 sections. The first represent the introductory section which is followed by the section of analysis of context, outcome assessment and the conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations section.. The Endline poses particular attention on the program outcomes to ensure that the context speaks with the main dimensions of intervention of the PoD. The third section addresses the key findings of the Endline, and finally the fourth section brings the conclusion and recommendations for similar interventions.

2. THE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

2.1. Political and Democratic Space

Over the past decade, Mozambique has gone through multiple political challenges such as consolidating its democracy, state reform, guaranteeing peace, growing political and social tensions, and implementing a new decentralization framework. The country maintains its formal democratic institutions such as a multiparty system and the regular elections. However, profound challenges, including democratic backsliding, political polarization (Pitcher, 2020), a lack of constructive political dialogue between key political actors, and a high centralization of power in party leadership – of the ruling and opposition parties alike – has undermined progress in governance and the country's commitment to democracy.

The implementation of the new decentralization framework, reinforced by the creation of provincial and district decentralized governance bodies (OGDP) and the consequent election of provincial governors through the provincial assemblies' elections lists, represented a major democratic gain, since it brought local institutions under the citizenry accountability.



However, whilst there were democratic gains, the political economy of the process, such as historical tendencies of centralization resulted in bycephalous model of shared, split and sometimes competing competences between the elected provincial bodies (OGDP) and the State Representation Bodies in the Province (OREP), causing coordination problems at the local level and with the central level. At the same time, terrorism in Cabo Delgado and the socioeconomic impacts of natural disasters continued to be significant challenges to the country's security, as well as to the capacity of institutions to promote inclusive development policies. All these factors combined shaped the democratic participation of women and young people in democratic spaces and their inclusion in political decision-making processes, central areas of the PoD Consortium.

2.2. Civic Space and Civil Society

Between 2021 and 2025, the Mozambican civil society continued to play a leading role in monitoring public policies, promoting good governance and human rights, despite the growing challenges affecting the country's civic space, currently rated "repressed" by Civicus¹. Factors contributing to the deterioration of the conditions in which civil society operates include restrictions on freedom of expression and information, press freedom and freedom of assembly and public participation through intimidation; kidnappings and disappearances of journalists; illegal detentions and physical violence; killings perpetrated with impunity, mainly by police officers and other security forces; attempts to deny permission for peaceful protests; stifling of spaces for people's participation; and increased controls impacting CSOs that monitor the government in the areas of democracy, governance, and human rights (Civicus, 2023). The trend of reduced international aid, particularly from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which in 2025 withdrew its financial support and technical assistance, has affected the ability of some CSOs to continue operating and implementing projects in several critical areas such as social sectors, human rights, democracy, and economic development (Guente, 2025). This situation may have contributed to undermining the financial and programmatic sustainability of organizations operating in these areas, including CSOs led by women and young people.

2.3. Gender Equality and Women Political Participation

Mozambique has public policies that favour gender equality, having ratified relevant regional and international instruments to promote equal rights and opportunities between women and men, notably the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW), the United Nations 2030 Agenda, and the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. At the national level, there is a Gender Policy and Implementation Strategy and a Gender Strategy in Public Administration 2020-2024, which defines guidelines for the integration of gender equality and equity in all State institutions. In the current Parliament, women occupy 39% of the seats, a female representation rate above the Sub-Saharan African average of 26.9% and the global average of 27.3%.² Parity was achieved in the national government. CSOs have played an important role for this progress by delivering capacity building to parliamentary women and those aspiring political power, addressing relevant topics such as legislation leadership and advocacy in order to make them more influent in the political decisions processes (MMO, 2025).

In this context, women's participation in politics in Mozambique has evolved positively about formal representation, but challenges remain from a substantive point of view. Although women's leagues have been created, at least within parliamentary political parties, with the role of mobilizing and training women members, they are still perceived as bodies subordinate to male leaders and have little power to influence decision-making internally. Also elected women fail to advocate for other women's interests because they ascend to the political power without a clear agenda of gender (Zebra, 2022).

¹ <https://monitor.civicus.org/country/mozambique/>. Accessed on November 5th, 2025.

² www.ipu.org Accessed on November 5th, 2025.



2.4. Youth Political Engagement

The youth population is growing in Mozambique, as revealed by data from the last 3 Censuses (1997, 2007, and 2017). Although youth represent about 80% of the population under 35 years of age, 29.3% of people aged 18 to 35 in 2024 (15.9% men, 13.4% women), their political involvement remains low. There is legislation favourable to the participation of young people in the country's democratic processes, platforms from civil society and political parties to promote the inclusion of young people, as well as recognition by party leaders of the crucial role of young people in democratic processes. For example, parties with seats in Parliament integrate youth into their social bodies and leagues, but young people have not been sufficiently supported within their parties and are underrepresented in state decision-making bodies (IMD, 2021a) due to the prevalence of an authoritarian political culture, coupled with limited access to education, poverty, and sociocultural norms that prevent the active involvement, especially of young women and people with disabilities (Feijó, Maquenzi, & Agy, 2022). Because of the feeling of exclusion from formal power arenas and disillusionment with party leadership, many young people unaffiliated with political parties have chosen to seek alternative paths of engagement, taking advantage of digital platforms to carry out their political and civic activism, contradicting the idea that young people are naturally apathetic to politics. Engagement on digital platforms has contributed significantly to increasing youth awareness and participation (MAP Consultoria, 2024).

3. Outcome Measurements

The outcome measurement will be based on the elements defined in the End-Term report template, namely:

- *What are the definitions used for the indicator*
- *How was the indicator measured (what tool, what/who was included in sample)*
- *What are the differences in definitions and data collection process between baseline, midterm and end-term?*
- *Reflect on what the value represents, how should the numbers be interpreted based on the context?*
- *Explanation of the difference between baseline, midterm and end-term value*
- *What does the difference in value say about the progress made for this outcome? What is the progress towards the objectives of the programme.*
- *To what extent does the actual value differ from the end-term target value?*

These elements will be used to analyse the Long-term outcome (LTO) and the intermediate outcomes.

3.1. Long-Term Outcome 1 (LTO1): Consortium, partner networks and local civil society organizations are effective catalysts for change

<i>The consortium, partner networks and local civil society organizations are effective catalysts for change</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
IMD is a financially stable and sustainable organization enabling change in politics in Mozambique	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

IMD's **financial stability and sustainability** is understood here as the organization's capacity to diversify funding and maintain its operations beyond the implementation period of the PoD project. At the baseline the quantitative measurement of IMD financial stability was based on number of donors (seven at that time) and their share of funding, heavily skewed to the Dutch funding, which accounted for more than 60% of the resources (IMD, 2021a). The measurement was aimed at assessing IMD's organizational health and financial sustainability based on the capacity of fundraising and diversification of funding partners. With regards to organization capacity, the baseline report points out to the absence of a capacity development plan and refers to the initial



training of 8 staff members as part of PoD activities. rather a qualitative description of IMD's sustainability as concerning, and narrative reports pointed out to the need of strengthening internal capacity and funding. There was not a quantitative measurement of the financial sustainability indicator throughout the implementation of the project. The organizational capacity component was blended in the intermediate outcome and was monitored as number of consortium partners/country office trained (outcome indicator 1.1). However, in the training the financial component continued important and was reflected on the focus of creating capacity in partner organizations to mobilize funds. During the implementation of PoD, IMD staff were trained in multiple areas, including in project management, English and fundraising.

Basically, this outcome indicator was rather measured and monitored more broadly and qualitatively, focusing on the creation of organizational capabilities through training of staff. But there are elements in the reporting and indicator assessment that informs about the results of PoD in this area. Outcome harvesting, and capacity assessments shows that IMD and other organizations have worked as effective catalysts of change, even if their financial stability and sustainability was not strictly measured. For example, in 2022 IMD coordinated the development of a *national Women's Agenda* with broad buy-in (with civil society organizations, political parties and the Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare) (IMD, 2022), which indicates the organization's growing convening power and legitimacy in civil society and national politics. This can be considered a key aspect of sustainability, although not financial, considering the organization's capacity to stay relevant and mobilize resources based on its reputation and standing in national politics.

In sum, this outcome was measured through narrative at the baseline and mid-term, using qualitative evidence, from the annual reports, the outcome harvesting and the mid-term report. By endline, these narratives provided elements for the evaluation.

The qualitative evidence suggests that **by program end, IMD had strengthened its capacity and credibility**, allowing it to drive change more effectively. For instance, IMD's leadership in formulating the Women's Political Agenda - "a result of the consortium, partner networks and CSOs being effective facilitators of change" (IMD, 2023b, p. 6). Financially, IMD maintained stability throughout PoD – it managed a multi-year budget without major shortfalls and secured funding for follow-up initiatives (e.g. a new project on women's political participation in 2025), which points toward partial sustainability. Therefore, the "value" of this outcome, while not a quantitative metric, can be seen in IMD's actions and status: by 2025 it acted as a hub for multi-actor political dialogues, and had diversified support – a qualitative leap from the start of PoD. This was a result of an **evolution of IMD from the baseline, through the midterm up to the endline**, from an organization funded mostly through Dutch Strategic Partnership, at the mid-term it has begun playing a facilitator role, reflected on the work done with parties to introduce zebra lists, gender and youth issues in their political platforms and the influence in the election of two women leaders/Secretary Generals in the two main opposition parties Renamo and MDM at the beginning of the PoD (IMD, 2023a). The role of IMD was also instrumental to the adoption of the Women's Political Agenda by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Affairs, resulting in its work with the Government entities as well. In addition, IMD organized a high profile and attended International Conference on Democracy in 2025, hence, consolidating its role as a convenor and facilitator of key processes in national politics. Financially, the diversification of funding, resulting from another PoD factor – capacity development that contributed to the improvement of staff skills in this and other areas, is an indicator of improved effectiveness.

In sum, whilst financial sustainability is a goal difficult to achieve in the context of the Mozambican CSOs and the current development aid landscape, IMD managed to diversify funding and secure a follow up project and, more importantly, has consolidated its position as a key player in Mozambican politics. An example of this effectiveness is the role the organization is playing as one of the financial and technical assistance managers of the Political Dialogue. A signal of the trust political actors has in IMD's work and of its importance and reliability in supporting and facilitating political processes in the country. Whilst there are not quantitative metrics to gauge the evolution from the baseline to the endline, the evolution and progress are clear through the narrative of change and transformation IMD has gone through, stemming from the implementation of the PoD project.

3.1.1. Intermediate Outcome Indicator 1.1: PoD Consortium Works complementarily



Mozambique - IMD

1.1 PoD Consortium Works complementarily	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of consortium partners/partners/country office staff trained	8	11	19	36

This indicator measures the organizational capacities of PoD Consortium member organizations and CSOs that the programme worked with. It is mostly aimed at counting the number of individuals from IMD and partner organizations who received training, workshop, webinar aimed at improving their skills (training in gender mainstreaming, dialogue facilitation, M&E, etc.) to strengthen their organizational capacity to implement the programme (IMD, 2023b) and strengthening the consortium organizations' complementary work. Basically, the **definition remained the same, since the baseline up to the present endline**. Data was collected from the programme reporting documents.

Effectively, the indicator measured the number of trained IMD office staff. The baseline data indicates that the program started with a base of 8 trained members, in peer exchange with Akina Mama wa Africa for IMD's Women's Academy staff, which did not evolve throughout the implementation in subsequent years (IMD, 2023b). The mid-term target of 20 was not met. Progress remained low in 2024, with only two training sessions held, one in partnership with the Mzalendo Trust and the second part of the exchange of experiences between members of the Power of Dialogue Consortium, promoted by Akina Mama Wa Africa. The weak results of this indicator in 2024 were due to the constant postponement of capacity-building actions, suggesting that there may have been logistical problems during the management of the program (IMD, 2024). One factor that impacted the implementation of PoD was the unrest that followed the 2023 local elections and, more seriously, the violent protests that followed the 2024 general and provincial elections. Despite these drawbacks, other actions were implemented demonstrating an increased level of collaboration and commitment to strengthening internal capacities. Notable examples include the Project Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (PMEL) meeting held in Kenya in 2022, which facilitated the exchange of monitoring tools between IMD, NIMD, Akina Mama Wa Africa, Goree Institute and CEMI (IMD, 2022), and the establishment of a continuous communication strategy among partners, sharing tools such as GRIP – Gender Roadmap for Inclusive Policies (IMD, 2023b) and others.

Regarding GRIP, it is important to mention that the Women's Political Academy began using this tool with political parties in 2021, initially working only with the MDM party so that this party, which had no women represented in Parliament, could take the first steps towards inclusion (2022 Outcome Harvesting, Outcome 1). Thus, the IMD not only provided training but also made concrete tools available to political parties to guide internal changes. According to the 2021 Annual Report, the IMD also focused on its internal strengthening, with 8 staff members receiving project management and English language training in 2021 and the creation of an institutional development plan funded by multiple projects, which to some extent contributed to ensuring the sustainability not only of the PoD but also of other programs. Up to the Mid-Term in 2023, the progress had not been substantial. Even though the target was not adjusted, and by the end of term the target of 32 was not clearly reached, and only 19 were trained, 59% of the total planned for the project end-term. While the output was less than planned, this does not mean necessarily that IMD's capacity development objectives were seriously undermined, as the identified results suggest.

The main result was the institutional strengthening of the IMD in key areas of programme management. For example, the meeting held in Kenya likely improved monitoring systems, increasing the technical capacity of the program's interventions. With those trained staff, IMD successfully implemented Outcome Harvesting, coordinated multi-actor events, and produced quality PoD reports – evidence that a capable core team existed to manage the project and deliver on its results. This means that the capacity improved in comparison to the baseline, but the output was less than projected.

With regards to complementary work, the 2024 report mentions an improved interaction and joint work between the members of the PoD programme, with synergistic actions and joint events held in Uganda and Kenya under coordination of Akina Mama Wa Africa, in which political and civic actors of the involved countries



participated exchanging experiences, hence contributing to consolidate the relationship and coexistence between these two type of actors (IMD, 2024).

3.1.2. Intermediate Outcome Indicator 1.2: PoD Consortium builds capacities

1.2 PoD Consortium builds capacities	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of CSOs (i.e IMD) with increased capacities (other led)	1	1	43	19

This **indicator's definition** focuses on strengthening the capacities of IMD and other organizations so that they can become more proactive. Since IMD is covered in indicator 1.1, this is supposed to focus more on “other partner organizations”. At baseline the only organization that was assessed was IMD itself, hence the value 1 for this stage of the project. The Endline target was to create capacity in a total of 19 organizations, since IMD was already covered, this means that the support would be too additional 18 organizations. The definition was not changed over the course of the implementation of PoD.

The Measurement of the indicator was done considering the key activities contributing to create capacity in organizations such as: capacity-building workshops, training-of-trainers, exchange visits, and provision of tools like the Gender Roadmap (GRIP) to local organizations. The indicator reporting defines it as “CSOs with increased organizational capacities”. Thus, a CSO was counted as “with increased capacity” if it participated in a significant capacity building intervention as reported in the annual reporting, including in indicators and outcome harvesting analysis. The measurement sought to track the CSOs participation in multiple capacity development to avoid double-counting across years, since the indicator refers to the creation of organizational capacities and not a simple participation in related activities. Thus, organizations that benefitted from multiple activities throughout the different years of the project and were reported in the annual counting are counted just once in the endline. This was the case of AMCS and ADEPA, which participated in capacity development activities in 2023 and 2024.

Data collection evolved from qualitative and focused on IMD to a broader qualitative and quantitative, relying on the improvement of the reporting and monitoring and evaluation, especially after 2022. Thus, it was possible to track the capacity development activities and most of the organizations involved (although not all) and assess effectiveness with the outcome harvesting data. This made the assessment of progress possible and based on evidence.

Interpreting the indicators' values, the 2023 Mid-Term Outcome Measurement (MTE) Report shows that the mid-term value remained the same as of the baseline, at 1 – much below the target of 9. That value remained at least until the first half of 2023, since only IMD's administrative staff benefited from training in the Gender Roadmap for Inclusive Political Parties (GRIP), with the aim of providing them with knowledge and tools to train, sensitize, and influence political parties for the increase of women in elected democratic parties and institutions. According to the 2023 MTE Report, until its completion in mid-2023, no interventions had been carried out to strengthen other CSOs, due to the need to prioritize interventions with political actors (parties, Parliament, and Provincial Assemblies) as part of preparatory actions to strengthen women's participation in electoral processes. This changed by the end of 2023 with 8 CSOs reported as benefiting from capacity development activities. In 2024 the growth of trained organizations was higher, with 30 CSOs reported as with increased capacities, an evolution that gained momentum with training on fundraising. Participating CSOs included ADEPA, AMCS, Observatório das Mulheres, AMODEFA, REDE CAME, Jovens do CISLAMO, ACAMO, FDC, Associação CODEMA, Fanelo Ya mina, AMAMO, CDD, Parlamento Juvenil, and OMD (IMD, 2024). Fund-raising was responsible for this considerable increase in the number of participants, since PoD decided to respond to a critical need of CSOs, in a context of reduced international aid, and many of organizations facing funding problems. By the end-term in



2025, 43 organizations were reported under this indicator as with improved capacities. This is 226% of the end-term target of 19.³ Apart from the organization strictly trained in this indicator, organizations were trained in lobby and advocacy and the related activities were reported under indicators 2.1 and 2.2.

Thus, it is important to highlight that although organizational capacity building interventions for CSOs received greater attention in the final phase of the PoD, the initial target of 19 was largely exceeded. The lack of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) models in the first year of PoD implementation hindered the data collection process and the measurement of institutional changes (IMD, 2023b). The focus on IMD as the sole beneficiary of the training programs in the first 2 years of the program has reduced the performance of this indicator, but eventually it gained traction and improved considerably up to the end-term. The monitoring also improved with more evidence produced.

The performance of this indicators is significant for the attainment of the LTO1 and for the programme impact. The main result of this outcome was the improvement of the CSOs organizational capacities led by women, young people and people with disabilities in areas such as Human Rights, gender integration in programmatic management and fund-raising (IMD, 2024; 2025). The evidence of the effectiveness of organizations after the capacity development was reported more qualitatively and at the aggregate level, such as in the participation of advocacy activities to influence policy actors' actions in improving youth and women participation. Most of the reporting and evidence is on the acquisition of staff skills and organizational capacities. Considering the number of the organizations involved, this per se is a considerable progress, since it contributes to create a network and a community of practice involving civil society, political parties, government and donors committed to improving women and youth participation and engagement in politics.

The project has delivered much more than the target, exceeding it in 126% (considering only the conservative estimate of counting only the intermediate outcome indicator 1.2). In his regard, the project was very effective. PoD contributed to build capacities of a wide array of CSOs with a potential of playing a catalytic role in the country democracy and politics, with a greater role for youth and women.

3.2. LTO2 – Outcome Indicator 2: Aspiring women political leaders are influential actors of change at the provincial and at the national level

Aspiring women political leaders are influential actors of change at the provincial and at the national level.	Baseline value	Midterm value	Endterm value	Endterm target
# of women and youth involved in politics who feel they are able to participate in decision-making processes	Youth – 18 Women - 131	Youth - 68 Women - 364	Youth – 70 Women - 350	Youth – 40 Women - 158

This **outcome indicator measures** the perceived empowerment of women and youth involved in politics. It measures the quantity of women and young people actively involved in politics (as elected officials, candidates, or activists in political organizations) that feel able to participate in (political) decision-making processes. It's a subjective indicator, since it is based on self-reported feelings of influence. At baseline, the values were 131 women and 18 youth. The end-term target was set at 158 women and 40 youth, reflecting an increase in confidence due to programme effects.

³ This number was obtained from the data of the indicator monitoring and annual reporting. An AI application analysis of the reports counted a total of 39 distinct organizations and networks directly benefitted, after controlling for double counting across years.



The measurement method of this indicator consisted of primary data collection via semi-structured interviews administered to women and youth in the target group at baseline (with women members of Parliament, women leaders in party youth leagues, and youth activists), desk review and project reports. The baseline produced the numbers 131 and 18, for women and youth, respectively. It was based on women and youth in National, Provincial and Municipal Assemblies, and in decision-making positions in the Judicial branch as well as in the national and local governments. For **midterm**, a **follow-up survey** was done in 2023. The midterm report states this indicator was measured through the number of women and youth who indicate they can participate, and data was collected via reports and interviews. The midterm results (364 women, 68 youth) show a considerable increase, which suggests that by midterm the sample or reach of the programme had grown (probably including many more women aspirants from training cohorts, etc.). **At end-term**, the data was gathered from the project reports and cross-reference with more recent events, such as the electoral results of 2023 local elections and 2024 national and provincial elections and the appointments resulting from the latter, since 2025.

Differences in Definitions/Data Collection: The core definition (*women/youth who feel able to participate*) stayed consistent, but the *coverage of respondents* expanded from baseline to midterm. **Baseline** likely focused on already elected or formally positioned individuals (hence 131 women, which include all women MPs and women in positions of leadership municipal and provincial assemblies, and in the national and local governments, and 18 youth corresponding to youth MPs and government appointees. In the Midterm, apart from those of the baseline, other actors were considered, namely political parties leaders – for example, the two opposition parliamentary parties – Renamo and MDM had appointed women as secretary generals; aspiring women leaders at provincial/local level (through the Women’s Political Academy training hundreds) and youth leaders in civil society, and the Government has attained gender parity in appointing 50% of women ministries (IMD, 2023b). **At end-term**, the scope was kept broad and new entrants from the 2023 local elections and 2024 national and provincial elections were considered. After the 2024 elections, some women who were previously in positions lost seats, and a new opposition party (PODEMOS) with fewer women gained seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies. These differences mean baseline was a smaller sample, whereas end-term was larger and included many who gained involvement during PoD, beyond elected officials and political appointees.

Regarding the evolution of the indicators’ values, there was a very high increase from baseline to mid-term of both women (from 131 to 364) and youth (from 18 to 68) from baseline to midterm. Such increases indicate a significant broadening of empowerment among the target groups. The potential causes for this change are: First, *the programme’s interventions (trainings, mentorship, exposure) likely boosted many women’s and youths’ confidence and sense of agency*. For instance, the Women’s Political Academy trained 369 women and 30 youth by midterm, which coincides with the numbers who feel empowered (IMD, 2023b). The midterm report explicitly highlights the “significant improvement since the baseline” and attributes it to women politicians gaining willingness to influence changes within parties and public space (IMD, 2023b, p. 6). By end-term and estimated ~350 women and ~70 youth remained empowered, with a slight decrease in Women and an increase in youth, still above the target of 158 women and 40 youth. The 2024 election results saw a 4% drop in women’s parliamentary representation.

Comparing Baseline, Midterm and End-Term, there was a considerable jump from the beginning of the project to the mid-term, even exceeding the target by almost fourfold for the youth and more than twofold for the women. The midterm report credited the programme’s strategy of maximizing reach by integrating training into party events (internal conferences), capturing large numbers of participants at once. This implies baseline undercounted or couldn’t reach many women, whereas midterm was more comprehensive. **End-term** values are roughly stable from midterm (364 to approximately 350 women, 68 to 70 youth, within margin). This stability suggests that the peak empowerment was around 2023 and sustained to 2025. The slight decrease in women (364 to ~350) was influenced by the contested 2024 elections (some who were hopeful to win or advance did not, possibly affecting their responses).

Progress toward LTO2 Objectives: The evolution of this indicator directly reflects **success in achieving LTO2**. The essence of LTO2 is that aspiring women and youth leaders become influential actors. This was reflected in the fact that numerous women trained by PoD ran for office in the 2023 local elections – which resulted in the increase of the number of women as party lead candidates, from 21 in 2018 to 24 in 2023, and 6 to 7 councillors in the same period – and a few high-profile outcomes occurred such as a woman being nominated for Maputo’s mayoral race for the first time, by the Party Nova Democracia – an outcome partially credited to PoD lobbying



efforts (IMD, 2023a). Moreover, with support from the initiative Path of Elections from a Gender Perspective of the Women's Political Academy, women's leagues became emboldened to demand more from their parties, as seen by their success in pushing for more female candidates (IMD, 2023a). PoD also contributed to the election of two women as party secretary generals resulting from the introduction of tools to promote inclusion in political parties, such as the Gender Road Map for Inclusive Political Parties (GRIP) and multiple lobbying and informal and formal advocacy initiatives (IMD, 2023b). Those are signs of women empowerment. Similarly, youth, though smaller in number, had instances of influence, for example, through the openness of the main parties to have more inclusive manifestos and to improve gender and youth integration in their political platforms, especially in the 2024 elections (IMD, 2024).

Extent of Actual vs Target: The end-term values far exceeded targets (especially for women: ~350 vs 158). This indicates the programme had a much larger empowering effect than expected. Possibly the target was modest because they anticipated difficulties breaking cultural barriers. However, by leveraging existing structures (like party conferences and women's party organizations), PoD was able to reach and empower far more women than planned. For youth, surpassing target (70 vs 40) is also notable given youth engagement in politics is relatively low. This success may be partially due to synergy with broader trends (youth activism rising globally and nationally in this period) and the programme's targeted inclusion of youth in activities like dialogues and training (though youth were fewer, those engaged clearly felt more capable).

With regards to target adjustment, the Project was conservative. At midterm, seeing the high values, the PoD team noted *"target value remains relevant and does not need to be adjusted"* (IMD, 2023b, p. 6). Despite the high values, much beyond the target, lack of adjustment of the endline target might suggest that the project had a conservative view of what it would be possible to achieve. To some extent, this suggests that the PoD team did not build on the experience up to the mid-term to realistically analyse the potential of achievement, hence creating an idea of an outstanding performance. Without questioning the success of PoD with regards to this indicator, the Mid-Term results could have been a good opportunity to adjust the target to a more realistic level and better explore what the project could achieve.

In summary, Outcome Indicator 2 signals a potential for a **transformative impact**. It is worth mentioning that the PoD was built on a history of a good participation of women in decision-making, reflected on the number of women holding key positions. The same cannot be said about the youth. The PoD programme, through its training and advocacy components, enhanced the existing potential by equipping women and youth with skills, knowledge, and networks.

3.2.1. Intermediate Outcome Indicator 2.1: Y&W Leaders strengthen their movements or organizations

2.1 Y&W Leaders strengthen their movements or organizations	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of L&A activities for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women / youth / minority groups) at national level	2	19	30	26

This indicator measures lobbying, and advocacy (L & A) initiatives conducted by PoD and its supported actors/partners to promote an inclusive political system. L&A activities include formal advocacy events (e.g. petition deliveries, press conferences, meetings with decision-makers) and informal lobbying (e.g. closed-door discussions, public campaigns) that specifically address inclusion of women, youth, or marginalized groups in politics. By mid-term, the count was 19, indicating a considerable increase of advocacy initiatives in 2022 and early 2023. At end-term, a cumulative total of 27 national L&A activities were documented over 2021–2025.



The baseline data show 2 ongoing activities under PoD to promote a more inclusive political system: the meeting between diplomatic entities and the Party Women's Leagues, and the Conference of Women Peace and Security. Still in the first year of PoD implementation, the Women's Political Academy supported 3 L&A activities, forming two of the three women's leagues initially planned (Renamo and MDM), since Frelimo did not join. In these sessions, at least 40 women leaders were trained in political lobbying to influence the increase of female representation in political institutions, including topics related to the Constitution of the Republic, Decentralization, quality of female participation, institutionalization of quotas and adoption of Zebra lists in the candidate lists for the representative bodies elected for the 2023 and 2024 elections (IMD, 2021b). In 2022, the training focused on the use of the GRIP, an L&A tool with the aim of strengthening the capacity of women and men who hold leadership and decision-making positions in political parties. The beneficiaries were the leaders of the different social bodies of the three parliamentary parties, which included their women's and youth leagues (IMD, 2022).

By the time of the Mid-Term Assessment, 19 activities had been completed, increasing to 27 by 2024. The activities carried out included formal meetings, as well as informal sessions with parliamentary (IMD, Renamo and Frelimo) and extra-parliamentary political parties (PARENA and the Democratic Alliance Coalition, and later the PODEMOS), as part of PoD's strategy to influence change within political parties. In these events, political actors competing in the October 2024 general elections were made aware of the need to draft inclusive electoral manifestos, where the interests of women and young people were considered and publicized during the electoral campaign. The electoral period created favourable conditions for these L&A actions to take place, increasing pressure on political parties to adopt inclusive policies (IMD, 2024). Consequently, women's leagues within political parties gained more voice and space in decision-making. For example, the Renamo and MDM parties appointed women to the position of Secretary General in 2022, a new historical phenomenon in Mozambique's young democracy (IMD, 2022). In June of the same year, a task force was also created to legalize gender parity (zebra lists) in political party candidate lists, following a dialogue and advocacy session held by the Women's Political Academy (2022 Outcome Harvesting, Outcome 3).

The performance of this intermediate indicator contributed to the progress towards LTO2, since these L&A efforts are a direct manifestation of young and women leaders strengthening their influence. Through PoD support, women's leagues and youth groups were empowered internally and became able to take their agendas to the decision-making level. The L&A activities were directed towards legal reforms like the enactment of a Gender Parity Law (IMD, 2022)/Outcome Harvesting 2022 and institutional changes, like more youth representation in party decision bodies. The fact that 27 separate efforts occurred shows that the programme created the conditions for a sustained flow of advocacy work. This contributed to concrete outcomes: while the Parity Law was not yet passed, the advocacy surrounding it raised awareness and generated political will – evidenced by all parties committing to more inclusive manifestos (IMD, 2024)/Outcome Harvesting 2024). Thus, this intermediate outcome 2.1 was generally achieved, since, with support of PoD, women and youth effectively advocated and lobbied decision-makers with multiple engagements to ensure the participation of the groups they represent in politics.

The end-term target of 26 was achieved and slightly surpassed with the total of 27 L&A activities carried out by the end-term. The mid-term value of 19 had already overshoot the target of 12 as well. The End-Term target of 26 was not adjusted in the mid-term, despite the outstanding performance. This was a consistent decision, since the subsequent years had less L&A activities, although consequential (especially the work to influence the 2023 and 2024 elections), and at the end-term the performance was close to the defined target. In summary, actual performance achieved the target and slightly exceeded it, underscoring that PoD effectively mobilized its networks to champion inclusive politics at the national level.

3.2.2. Intermediate Outcome Indicator 2.2: Y&W leaders lobby and advocate in decision-making spaces

2.2 Y&W leaders lobby and advocate in decision-making spaces	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target



Number of women/youth leaders trained	55 women 23 youth	369 women 30 youth	589 women 212 Youth	660 women 200 youth
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This indicator is oriented towards measuring the effort in strengthening the L&A capacities of young women and women leaders to influence the political decision-making process. The target values were 55 women, and 23 young people trained, both of which were exceeded, especially the target related to women. The 2023 MTE Report shows that these numbers grew steadily, reaching 369 women and 30 young women. In 2024, the final cumulative total was 412 women, and 102 young women trained (IMD, 2024). The idea of strategically using party events, such as internal meetings or internal conferences of parties or women's leagues to offer training, allowed for increased reach (IMD, 2023b). However, the gender disparity in training sessions is concerning. For example, in the training held in the first half of 2024, out of a total of 195 participants, only 38 (19%) were women. Although youth participation stood at 37%, only 33% were women. It is indeed important that the project significantly involves men as part of the strategy to end patriarchal norms that are harmful to gender, but this should not be at the expense of greater female presence and participation. The main beneficiaries of the training were parliamentary women, women members of the APs, Party Youth Leagues, etc., with whom topics such as gender equality and female leadership in the parliamentary context were addressed, women's participation in local planning processes, the role of women in political decision-making processes, and youth influence in political parties.

In general, these practical training sessions for women and young people to exercise L&A within their political parties generated impressive impact from the point of view of awareness about quota policies, inter-party dialogue, and electoral reform initiatives. According to the 2021 Annual Report, after a training session, women and young people of the MDM League developed a lobbying plan proposing Black-White-Orange (Woman-Man-Young) candidate lists to enable women and young people to be eligible in the upcoming elections. In this way, the PoD managed to translate the training into direct lobbying actions, with women and young people using their agency to negotiate with their party leaders. However, the death of the MDM Party president, Daviz Simango, may have contributed to delays in achieving greater progress, as it was necessary for the Women's Political Academy and the MDM Women's League to make additional efforts to persuade the new party leadership to continue the agenda of adopting a Zebra list previously supported by the deceased president (IMD, 2021b). MDM went on to appoint women party secretary general in 2022 and Spokesperson. Renamo followed suit appointing its Secretary General in 2022 as well. These are examples of the impact the work of PoD had in decision-making arenas.

There was a considerable increase of training of the target group from the baseline to the mid-term. Coupling of training with a meeting of the parties or women party leagues allowed for a higher outreach of the target group (IMD, 2023b, p. 10). However, mid-term target of women and youth trained was not achieved (369 women and 30 youths against a target of 460 women and 100 youths). The indicator target was not adjusted because it was assumed that the existing pace it was possible to reach the end-term target of 660 women and 200 youth. The final counting at the end-term fell short (although close) of the target, registering 561 women up to (2024) and about 180 youth up to 2025. The data of 2025 are not consolidated yet (hence the highlight in the indicator's table), which means that potentially the target can be met.

This intermediate outcome is contributing consistently to the LTO2, with significant results in training political leaders to contribute to a more inclusive political system. PoD has done a lot of work in the preparation of the 2023 local elections and 2024 National and Provincial elections, working with parties for an inclusive electoral platform, and in the appointment of women and youth in the electoral lists (IMD, 2024). However, the 2023 and 2024 elections did not result necessarily in an increase in the representation of women and youth. Broader politics also played out. Whilst Frelimo kept and increased its representation and control of municipalities and maintained a high representation of women in Parliament of 47% of its group, Renamo and MDM lost ground to the new entrant PODEMOS, which was less involved in the PoD work (IMD, 2024). The net result was a reduction of representation of women in the National Assembly from 43% in the previous term of 2020-2025 to 39% in the current 2025-2030 term, and in the provincial Assemblies the representation of women ranges between 30 to 35% (IMD, 2024). However, training of women and youth leaders progressed throughout 2025, and IMD has created structures to ensure the continuation of this work, such as the already mentioned Women Political Academy and its multiple initiatives and the Democratic Youth Academy, which have established ties with political parties, civil society organizations, the Assembly of the Republic and Diplomatic Entities (IMD, 2025).



PoD also simulated the continuous dialogue between party leaderships and women and youth leagues, to reduce elitization and stimulate dialogue and the creation of space for the target group to influence internal transformation. This is combined with the institutionalization of knowledge and creation of conditions for replication through joint training of civil society organizations and internal department of parties (IMD, 2025), which can stimulate the creation of a community of practice to sustain the process continuously in the future.

3.3. LTO 3: Outcome Indicator 3 – Civic and political actors collaborate peacefully on the basis of trust

Civic and political actors collaborate peacefully on the basis of trust	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of inclusive policy-making processes	6	7	8	9

An “**inclusive policy-making process**” is defined as a policy development or decision-making process that involves input and collaboration from a diverse set of stakeholders, notably including multiple political parties and civil society, especially women’s and youth groups, the target groups of PoD. As per de baseline, inclusive policymaking is the one occurring in fora of participation, such as the Development Observatory, the Government policy processes, the parliamentary decision, the legislative committee’s consultation process, the sectorial policy process, among others. The focus is at the national level (e.g. national laws, national dialogues).

Measurement: At baseline, 6 such processes were identified as inclusive, basically existing forum such as the Development Observatory, the government ordinary policy processes that can potentially involve multiple stakeholders, the legislative process at the National Assembly and the consultation process of the National Assembly Committees in the legislative process, and the policy making of the two ministries in whose portfolios – women and youth – are POD’s target groups, namely the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare (IMD, 2021a). By mid-term, one additional inclusive process was counted (bringing it to 7). At end-term it was identified one more, for a total of 8 inclusive processes during 2021–2025. Data came from programme records and external documentation of political processes. The process was counted as inclusive if it met the criteria of multi-actor participation and was *ongoing or completed* – not just a one-off event.

Notably, this indicator changed only marginally, which might reflect both a challenging context and a conservative counting. To assess its progress, the project would have to screen the processes occurring in the fora above mentioned or other with the requisites defined above. It is important to note that in the 6 fora no particular process was identified, but existing processes. Two processes counted at end-term is the **Inclusive and Representative Electoral Manifesto and the National Youth Declaration** series facilitated by IMD in 2022–2023, which brought ruling and opposition parties together with CSOs to discuss electoral law changes, although it did not result in the reforms expected and the local elections were held under the old legislation (IMD, 2022/indicator Reporting, 2022; IMD, 2024); .

Interpreting these values, an increase from 6 to 8 indicates only a modest improvement in the prevalence of inclusive processes, but it is not far from the target of 9, which suggests that not much new processes were expected despite PoD’s efforts. Entrenched patterns of exclusive decision-making in Mozambique shifted only slightly. However, it’s important to consider quality: interviews and observations indicated that the *level of trust and collaboration within existing processes increased*, even if the count of processes barely did.

From baseline to end-term, one can interpret that Mozambique maintained its inclusive dialogue platforms The mid-term report noted “the interim report does not show a big difference between actual value (7) and the reference value (6)” (IMD, 2023b, p. 7). By end-term, adding one more to reach 8 meets the project goal of not backsliding, and achieving at least a slight increase.



This indicator's progress significance to LTO3 should not be taken straightforwardly. Whilst with modest progress, the existence of policy fora for inclusive decision-making means more trust/collaboration between the political actors. This trust and collaboration existed in other areas. Notably, PoD interventions like interparty dialogues and the inclusive manifesto roundtables (though counted under L&A activities, not here), directly fed into broader processes. For example, the manifesto roundtable in June 2024 (facilitated by PoD) led to a *cross-party agreement* on inclusion that became part of those parties' policy development – it is effectively an inclusive policy process outcome (IMD, 2024/Outcome Harvesting, 2024). That agreement among parties could be considered a new “inclusive policy” moment; and be included as contributing to an existing process of electoral policy formulation.

Target vs Actual: The target was 9 and PoD implementation achieved 8, missing the achievement by a little margin. But the target was conservative too, considering that not much evolution should be expected. But activities of PoD contribute to the same objective, although in other indicators, with qualitative evidence – all major parties signing a code of conduct for peaceful campaigns in 2023 with civil society witnesses (another inclusive process), and parliamentary parties agreeing to have inclusive Manifestos in 2024 influenced by the programme, are good examples of results in this area (IMD, 2023a; 2024).

3.3.1. Intermediate Outcome Indicator 3.1: political and civic actors address grievances

This indicator (3.1) comprises two sub-indicators, the first on the number of political and civic actors that have taken measures to enhance women and youth representation and the second on the number of agreements reached by these actores to approve and implement reforms to materialize the above-mentioned intent. The description of each sub-indicator is presented below followed by an analysis of the contribution of the indicator to the LTO3 and PoD objectives.

Number of political/civic actors taken measures enhancing representation of women and youth

3.1 Political and civic actors address grievances	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of political/civic actors taken measures enhancing representation of women and youth	1 Civic Actors 3 Political Actors	3 Civic Actors 5 Political Actors	33 Actors	27 Civic Actors 3 Political Actors

The sub-indicator measures the number of civic and political actors that took effective measures to improve the representation of women and youth in politics. The typical measure adopted by the parties has been through the definition of party quotas for these groups, being Frelimo de most systematic and consistent in this regard. Civic actors have historically defended the zebra lists and more representation of the youth, as is the objective of PoD, but with limited adoption from parties. Other potential actions from civil society organizations include capacity development activities, such as those implemented by PoD.

This indicator also showed growth. The baseline was 3 political actors and 2 CSOs, evolving to 5 and 3, respectively, at the mid-term (IMD, 2023b). As shown by the 2024 Annual Report, the final cumulative value rose to 7 political actors involved in adopting measures to improve the representation of women and youth in elected democratic institutions, such as Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. This implied that, in addition to the three historical parliamentary parties (Frelimo, Renamo and MD), the inclusion agenda also gained ground among extra-parliamentary parties, including PODEMOS, PARENA, PAHUMO and Revolução Democrática, some of which were little known in the Mozambican political system, but due to PoD influencing improvements in their electoral manifestos, they managed to gain some seats in Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (IMD, 2024).



The results show that, thanks to PoD, parties' women's leagues approved and committed to adopting a National Sustainable Agenda for Women, collaboratively developed involving CSOs, women's leagues, and the Ministry of Gender. This instrument, grounded on a human rights approach, constitutes a qualitative milestone towards the more effective implementation of women's civil and political rights. Furthermore, although not entirely successful, CSOs, through the Women's Political Academy, attempted to influence reforms in electoral legislation, advocating for the adoption of zebra lists (IMD, 2022)(see Outcome Harvesting 2022 Report, Results 3 & 5). Other relevant measures are: Renamo and MDM appointing women secretary generals, and the Government reaching parity in the Cabinet appointees in 2022, already mentioned.

Over time, the Women's Academy has consolidated itself as a permanent space for capacity building and advocacy, contributing to tangible results such as the appointment of more women to leadership positions in decision-making bodies at the national and local levels. By the first half of 2024, in addition to IMD, the number of CSOs that implemented measures to promote greater political inclusion of young women was 4, namely Mozambican Disability Observatory, Gender Links, Kubatsira and Women's Observatory (IMD, 2024).

The target for the parties was reached and surpassed, since new entrants in politics emerged from the 2024 elections beyond the three parliamentary parties that were considered at the baseline. The civic actors' targets were not reached and only 4 civic actors were active in presenting concrete proposals to improve women and youth participation. However, this does not mean that PoD was not effective in enabling civic actors to play a role in this matter. Civic organizations have joined PoD, some of them led by women and more organizations expressed their willingness to become part of the network (Power of Dialogue, 2025).

of agreements reached (reform agendas / policies / legal amendments)

3.1 Political and civic actors address grievances	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of agreements reached (reform agendas / policies / legal amendments)	0	1	3	8

This indicator measures the number of agreements political and civic actors reached to improve the representation of women and youth. As per the approach of PoD, the improvement of the representation of these two groups depends also on sensitization a work of lobbying and advocacy to break existing barriers, from power dynamics in parties to existing social norms. Hence, broad coalitions for policy and legal reform are important to promote changes in this area. Fora of inclusive policies are privileged arenas where these agreements can occur, and multi-actor coalitions can be created to support the intended changes.

The sub-indicator starts from a baseline of zero (0), suggesting that such agreements had not been reached up to the beginning of the project. By 2024, 3 important agreements had been reached: the Inclusive and Representative Electoral Manifesto, the National Youth Declaration, in the first semester, and the reform of the Electoral Law in the second half of 2024. The National Youth Declaration, which served as an advocacy instrument for the youth political agenda, is a positive result that was not foreseen, demonstrating the PoD's ability to adapt to the context (IMD, 2024). In this context, the PoD functioned as an important mechanism not only to influence reforms in the legal framework governing political participation in Mozambique, but also to create spaces for dialogue between political actors and civil society so that they could reach consensus regarding the necessary reforms.

As mentioned above, only 3 agreements were reached and the mid-term target of 6 was not achieved, the same with the overall target of 8. However, despite falling short of reaching the target, of the three agreements made, two (the Manifesto and the Declaration) have a potential of contributing to improve women and youth engagement.

The performance of this indicator is consistent with the LTO3 of building trust, since it shows a significative improvement of joint work and collaboration between civic and political actors to reach the common objective of improving women and youth participation. Although there are clear examples of joint work and collaboration, reflected on instruments such as Manifestos and Declarations, the cooperation is not always reflected on explicit agreements or arrangements to reach the intended results. Civic organizations need political parties to



materialize their advocacy work in policy and political decisions. Before reaching out to political parties, civic actors need to articulate among themselves and design proposals, which was not seen at the scale that was expected in the project. However, a positive element stemming from this indicator is the expansion of the circle of actors in civil society and in the political parties championing women and youth inclusion and participation in politics. This puts inclusion in a different and higher level of the political agenda, since it is no longer an issue of a few CSOs but of multiple societal, political and institutional actors. This is in line with the collaborative and trust building approach embodied in LTO3. This means that this indicator results, with its limitations, are a consistent contribution to the key outcomes of PoD.

3.3.2. Intermediate Outcome Indicator 3.2: Political and Civic Actors Build Trust

As in the previous indicator, this indicator also comprises two sub-indicators whose analyse will be separated with a general conclusion of the whole indicator at the end of this subsection.

Number of CSOs included in the PoD Programme (women led)

3.2 Political and civic actors build trust	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of CSOs included in the PoD programme (women led)	0	19	44	22

This sub-indicator is aimed to measure the number of women-led organizations engaged in PoD activities, as partners beneficiaries of capacity development activities or participated in initiatives organized by the project.

The indicator was assessed through desk review of PoD reports, especially in what concerns the information of CSOs activities.

This indicator reveals an expansion in the number of women-led CSOs that joined the PoD network. From a baseline of 0, the number increased to 19 CSOs at the mid-term (IMD, 2023b), and then another 16 in 2024, and 11 in 2025. Among the CSOs included in the PoD program in the period prior to the MTE, the following can be mentioned: Fórum Mulher, AMODEFA, Associação de Mulheres Rurais, MEPT, TXECA, FDC, AMCS and Gender Links, the Women's Observatory, Fanelo Ya Mina, ADEPA, MANAS, Youth Parliament, ROSC, MASC, Community Radio Forum, Be Girl, CESC, Bar Association, and HIKONE have shown interest in joining the program in the period following the MTE (IMD, 2024). The engagement of these organizations went beyond mere numbers. Including youth organizations (Bar Association and Youth Parliament) and organizations of people with disabilities (FAMOD and OMD) demonstrates a concern for integrating an intersectional perspective by considering gender, age, and disability factors.

The mid-term target was 10 and was exceeded. The same with the end-term target of 22, with 46 organizations, by twofold. In sum, the project achieved its targets and exceeded them considerable. A remarkable element is that as organizations were joining the project, a greater number of organizations led by women expressed their interest and willingness to participate (Power of Dialogue, 2025).

This good performance in bringing committed and relevant organizations to the network was instrumental to the project objective of ensuring sustainability, since it contribute to create a network of civic and political actors able to materialize the intents of the project and sustain activities over time, even after the end-term.

3.2 Political and civic actors build trust	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
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Number of interparty dialogue meetings (at national level)	2	6	13	18
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This indicator counts formal policy dialogue meeting between parties, under facilitation of IMD/PoD at national level.

The measurement of this indicator was through the compilation of interparty dialogues events at national level, facilitated and reported by the project.

The PoD sought to create and maintain spaces for dialogue, even in an electoral context and with high political polarization, to eliminate mistrust and prevent conflicts between partisan actors, government, and CSOs that normally see each other as enemies. The number of dialogue meetings tripled, going from a baseline of 2 to 6 in the mid-term in 2023, which is below the target of 10 (IMD, 2023b). In 2024, 6 more meetings were held and other 2 in 2025, bringing the final cumulative total to 13, against a project target of 18. This means that the indicator target was not met.

The activities in the group include interparty dialogue on electoral reform in 2021, dialogues on women's political participation with all parties, diplomats and civil society, held in March 2023, ahead of the local elections (IMD, 2023a), dialogues with political parties, Parliament with multiple parties on the legalization of gender parity (Zebra lists) in the candidate lists of political (IMD, 2022/Outcome Harvesting 2022), ahead of the 2024 elections PoD facilitated multiple actors' events to develop inclusive electoral manifestos, involving political parties and civil society actors (IMD, 2024).

Intermediate Indicator 3.2 shows **partial progress**: the participation of civil society organizations in the collective action to improve women and youth participation increased, although the collaborative work among these actors is less than what expected and ideal. Some notable collaborative agreements were forged (on inclusive political manifestos, women agenda, inclusion of gender and youth in political platforms), but broader systemic agreements (like comprehensive electoral reforms or multi-party accords on democratization) are difficult to reach and to mobilize actors to materialize them. This reflects both the difficulty of Mozambique's political context and the limits of a single programme's timeline such as PoD. Still, the agreements that do exist (women's agenda, inclusive manifesto commitments, etc.) are concrete legacies of improved trust, likely to influence ongoing efforts even after PoD's conclusion.

The multi-actor mobilization and the political agreements embodied in this intermediate indicator, are consistent and a good contribution to the LTO3 of enabling civic and political actors to collaborate peacefully on the basis of trust.

3.4 LTO 4 – Outcome Indicator 4: Political and civic actors strengthen democratic space by improving the position of women and youth in politics

Political and civic actors strengthen democratic space by improving the position of women and youth in politics	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of proposals aimed at strengthening democratic space (jointly) formulated and used for L&A	0	0	6	6

The indicator of this outcome measures the number of proposals – policy and legislative proposals – aimed at improving the civic and the political space, as well as the functioning of democratic institutions that have been formulated by the multiple actors involved in the project, especially aimed at improving women and youth participation, jointly formulated (by the multiple actors of PoD) for lobby and advocacy.



The measurement of the indicator consisted of identifying the proposals that fit the above-mentioned criteria. Some examples of these proposals, already mentioned, are: (1) the draft Gender Parity Law (jointly formulated by the task force including women MPs, CSOs) – a proposal for legal amendment (Outcome Harvesting, 2022); (2) the National Women's Political Agenda document (Outcome Harvesting, 2022); (3) the Inclusive Electoral Manifesto Recommendations (Outcome Harvesting 2024; (4) a set of Electoral Reform recommendations developed by civil society and presented to Parliament in early 2023.

At baseline, no proposal existed. The target was 6 by programme end, meaning PoD aimed to generate or facilitate six such proposals. PoD managed to produce all the six proposals by the end of the project. The proposals of gender parity and inclusive party manifestos are at the core of PoD objectives.

The good progress of this indicator is important for the achievement of the LTO4, since the above-mentioned proposals provide the roadmap for the improvement of democracy. For example, improving the effective representation of the two main demographic groups: women and youth, is a very important step to improve democracy.

3.4.1 Intermediate outcome indicators 4.1: Regional and international bodies promote and protect democracy

4.1 Regional and int. bodies promote and protect democracy	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of L&A activities for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women / youth / minority groups) at national level	0	22	23	21

As per the definition, this indicator seems to be duplicated in LTO2, indicator 2.1. However, it is a different one, considering that it involves international actors and advocacy. These are dialogue fora and initiatives involving multiple stakeholder groups – government, opposition, civil society, media – specifically focusing on issues of civic space and democracy (distinct from the strictly interparty dialogues counted earlier). Thus, **it will be defined as a measurement of L & A activities involving international actors and fora, and, therefore, it will include those activities, combined with those at national level.**

Regarding its measurement, the indicator assessment will focus on the identification and analysis of initiatives involving external and international actores and fora, combined with those at national level. The latter cannot be discarded completely, since the assessment at the mid-term and annually included those activities as well. This avoids discontinuities and discrepancies in counting but has a potential of having double-counting.

This indicator measurement was problematic. At the mid-term the number of events had evolved from 0 at baseline to 22, much beyond the target of 12, which is remarkable. The total number of events registered for the whole project is 23, against a target of 21, which means that the target was exceeded. There was not a separate numeric goal for international advocacy; it was encompassed in overall L&A targets. However, PoD effectively implemented planned international engagements, even if with most of the activities being national based under this indicator.

Under this outcome the project implemented initiatives under the complementary work with the consortium partners – for example, Akina Mama wa Africa facilitated training and the participation of PoD partners in regional events and initiatives of capacity development and exchange of experiences. Other activities involved ambassadors, and the diplomatic entities based in Mozambique. These initiatives add the international component to the process. In this regard, in 2023 IMD, through the Women's Political Academy organized two dialogue events hosted by the Ambassadors of Netherlands and of Finland, involving women leaders in politics (Provincial Assemblies Chairs, secretary generals of parties, president of women's leagues and civil society



leaders, women municipal elections candidates), with participation of ambassadors and women diplomats of various missions in Mozambique, to share ideas, experiences and good practices among national and international women (IMD, 2023a). In 2024 the PoD programme, with support of the Irish Embassy, organized a Conference on Women, Peace and Security (IMD, 2024). In 2025, the Programme organized an advocacy meeting between diplomatic entities and political and civic actors in partnership with the Dutch Embassy, youth from civil society and political parties on the quality of democracy and freedom in Mozambique (IMD, 2025). Also in 2025, PoD organized the International Conference on 30 Years of Electoral Democracy, which was originally scheduled for 2024 and originally themed International Conference on Women, Governance, Peace and Elections, but, due to the post-electoral violence, it was postponed. Conference was repurposed to include the challenges of electoral democracy and keeping its original theme, and it was an opportunity for gathering of national and international actors and for reflection and exchange of experiences to produce contributions for reforms and the ongoing political dialogue in Mozambique (IMD, 2025).

However, the role of these international actors in fostering the opening of the democratic space was not explicitly analysed. What has been remarkable is the increasing high-profile role IMD plays on democracy support nationally and in the region.

By conducting these regional/international advocacy actions, PoD linked Mozambican reform agendas to broader norms and pressure and to international networks. This intermediate result supports LTO4's idea that not only domestic but also external actors push for democracy.

3.4.2 Intermediate outcome indicator 4.2: Civic and political actors safeguard civic space

4.2 Civic and political actors safeguard civic space	Baseline value	Midterm value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Number of multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings (at national level)	1	7	9	23

The indicator seeks to measure how frequent and intense the multiple stakeholders involved in PoD meet, as manifestation of the vibrance of the civic space. It was measured identifying relevant events contained in the project reports. Hence, the assessment is based on secondary data and mostly project reporting.

The number of multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings increased significantly, from 1 at baseline to 7 in the Mid-Term and reached a total of 9, against a target of 23. One example of this type of dialogue is the holding of regional training sessions for members of the 10 existing Provincial Assemblies in the country, addressing issues related to the quality of political participation in Mozambique, and the protection of the rights of women and girls in the extractive industry (2021 Outcome Harvesting, Outcome 3), empowering these institutions to better fulfil their responsibilities in the democratic governance of the country, including safeguarding the rights of marginalized groups. The 2024 Annual Report states that two additional meetings were held in 2024. The first involved women diplomats and women leaders in politics in Mozambique and civil society, in partnership with the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, while the second was between diplomatic entities and an international human rights organization. Both meetings allowed multi-stakeholder dialogues to contribute to safe spaces for debate and the strengthening of civic space, in a context where rights and freedoms are under pressure (IMD, 2022). Furthermore, the successful implementation of these meetings in such a turbulent context demonstrates organizational maturity and programmatic resilience. However, these multi-stakeholder dialogues failed to deliver tangible political results for strengthening the democratic space, with no concrete joint proposals between political parties and civil society being used for lobbying (IMD, 2023b).

The programme convened 9 national multi-stakeholder dialogues involving a spectrum of actors beyond just political parties. These dialogues, ranging from conferences on women's political participation to inclusive elections roundtables, significantly contributed to building trust across society and politics, enhanced



participation, thereby expanding democratic space. The replication of this indicator underscores its dual role as both an outcome and a continuing process under LTO4.

Analysing LTO4, intermediate indicators show that PoD successfully convened broad dialogues (indicator 4.2 met) and engaged international actors (indicator 4.1, although its international component was not properly monitored and assessed) to support the project efforts in strengthening the democratic space. The main gap was in the number of formal joint reform proposals, which were very limited. This suggests that while the processes were put in place (dialogues, networks, awareness), converting them into policy outputs proved difficult in the timeframe of the project and under the existing contextual conditions. Nevertheless, the foundation laid for democratic space is notable: PoD established lines of communication between civil society and state and created a broad coalition for change (through multi-stakeholder dialogues and advocacy at international fora) that can be leveraged beyond 2025, after the end of the project.



3.5(Intermediate) outcome cumulative value table

The cumulative value table, with all the intermediate outcome indicators' measurements is presented below.

LTO	Indicator	Unit (Baseline)	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Cumulative
LTO1	# of consortium partners/partners/country office members trained	8	11	2	2	2	19	36
	# of CSOs with increased organizational capacities (other led)	1	1	0	8	30	4	43
LTO2	# of L&A activities for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women / youth / minority groups) at national level	2	2	12	6	8	2	30
	# of women/youth leaders trained	55 Women 23 Youth	110 women 30 youth	242 women	160 women	43 women 171 youth	34 Women 11 Youth	589 women 212 Youth
LTO3	# of political/civic actors taken measures enhancing representation of women and youth	1 Civic Actors 3 Political Actors	3 political parties	4 Civic Actors 3 Political Actors	8 Political actors	11 Political actors	4 Political actors	33 actors
	# of agreements reached (reform agendas / policies / legal amendments)	N/A	0	0	1	3	2	6
	# of CSOs included in the PoD programme (women led)	N/A	3	9	7	16	11	46
	# of interparty dialogue meetings (at national level)	2	1	1	3	6	2	13
LTO4	# of L&A activities for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women / youth / minority groups) at national level	0	3	7	8	3	2	23
	# of multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings (at national level)	1	1	3	1	2	1	8



4. Conclusions, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

4.1. Conclusions

Overall, the *Power of Dialogue (PoD)* programme had a positive impact on fostering collaboration, participation, and influence among political and civic actors to promote women's and youth engagement in Mozambique's political processes. Significant gains were observed in the participation of women and youth in civic and political spaces since the programme's inception. The number of women and young people who felt capable of participating in political decision-making has progressively increased from the baseline to the endline. The programme trained a cumulative 621 women and 213 youth in leadership, advocacy, and lobbying skills, creating a strong basis for the women and youth civic leaders. This translated into modest but tangible increases in women's representation, such as the women's leagues influence to their parties to put more women as lead candidates in the 2023 municipal elections (24, up from 21 in 2018), resulting in a slight rise in women elected as local councillors (from 6 to 7 in same period), and notably, for the first time in Mozambican history, a major party nominated a woman as its top candidate for Mayor of Maputo in 2023, and the two main opposition parties appointed women as secretary generals – breakthroughs attributed in part to PoD-facilitated advocacy and networking. These outcomes indicate that women's and youth's participation and confidence in politics have indeed increased, even if such advances at the grassroots and mid-levels outpaced changes in formal elected positions.

Crucially, the programme also improved collaboration between political and civic actors in advancing women and youth's inclusion. PoD's dialogue fora, training workshops, and advocacy coalitions cultivated greater trust and joint action across traditionally divided groups. By June 2024, all major political parties – including opposition and extra-parliamentary parties – agreed in a PoD-facilitated initiative to draft inclusive electoral manifestos incorporating women's, youth, and disability agendas. This collective commitment signifies a shift in attitudes: political actors showed increased openness to civil society input and recognized the importance of inclusion. Similarly, the PoD consortium helped convene a multi-stakeholder task force in 2022 to advocate for a “zebra” (gender parity) electoral law, bringing together civic activists and party members to jointly address a long-standing barrier to women's representation. The frequency of multi-party dialogues and consultations involving civil society also rose markedly – for instance, national interparty dialogue meetings grew from only 2 at baseline to 6 by 2024. While trust-building proved to be a gradual process, these qualitative outcomes demonstrate that relationships between civic and political actors have warmed and become more cooperative. Even the international diplomatic community altered its behaviour in support of women's political participation: European ambassadors who engaged with PoD increased their engagement in organizing meetings and dialogue with women politicians and activists. Such changes in the behaviour of influential actors – from party leaders to diplomats – reflect a substantial change to an environment more supportive of women's political agency.

Despite these achievements, the programme faced important limitations and contextual challenges that add nuances to its positive outcomes. Changes in perceptions and attitudes, while evident among those directly involved, were not uniformly widespread. Patriarchal norms and internal party cultures continue to hinder women's advancement: Mozambique has no legal requirements for gender parity in party lists, so women's inclusion depends on voluntary party commitment, which varies widely from party to party. This has practical consequences for the advancement of women and youth participation as reflected in the reduction of women's representation in the National Assembly after the 2024 elections women from 43% to 39%, partly due to the success of a new party that fielded very few women candidates. This setback illustrates how gains can be fragile and subject to reversal in the absence of structural guarantees. In PoD's results, the ultimate impact on formal power structures fell short of aspirations. Women still headed only a handful of electoral lists in 2024 – a “shy” outcome given that women comprise the majority of the population – and key policy reforms, such as a legal gender quota (the zebra list bill), had not passed by end term.

Progress toward inclusive governance thus remained incremental. Similarly, the target of jointly formulated proposals to expand democratic space was only half met: by 2025, three major inclusion agendas (e.g. a Women's National Agenda on Politics and a draft parity law) were developed with PoD support, but most remained as proposals rather than enacted changes. This indicates that while PoD successfully facilitated the **development** of inclusive policies, the **implementation** of those policies is lagging. Contextual realities – such as sporadic



political tensions, a restrictive NGO law, and conflict in certain provinces – also constrained the change pathways. For instance, periods of post-election unrest and government crackdowns on dissent limited the willingness of actors to collaborate and delayed some activities, meaning progress was not uniform across the board. By the end of the programme, Mozambique’s civic space remained constrained, which poses hurdles for women and youth activists to be heard in formal fora. These challenges underline that transforming deep-rooted attitudes and power structures is a long-term endeavour, beyond the scope of a single programme cycle.

Reflecting on the programme’s Theory of Change (ToC), the PoD intervention logic was largely validated, but with important caveats. The ToC envisioned that strengthening civil society capacity and creating platforms for dialogue would empower women and youth and foster more inclusive, collaborative politics. Indeed, many outcomes aligned with this pathway: the PoD consortium and partners emerged as effective facilitators of change (for example, spearheading the Women’s Political National Agenda), and empowered female actors used their skills and networks to influence political processes (such as women’s leagues lobbying for more female candidates). Empowerment of aspiring women leaders (Long-Term Outcome 2) clearly led to greater confidence and some trailblazing appointments – for example, during PoD two women were appointed Secretary-Generals of two major opposition parties, a ground-breaking event.

These developments suggest the ToC’s assumptions about building individual and organizational capacity contributing to change were sound. Moreover, the actor-based approach of engaging multiple stakeholders proved wise: targeting not only women activists but also political party structures, media, and even diplomatic allies created a coalition for change that amplified the programme’s influence. However, the ToC may have underestimated the time and advocacy intensity needed to translate dialogue into policy action. Certain pathways – such as achieving legal reforms or deeply shifting patriarchal attitudes – did not fully materialize within the programme period, largely due to external political and social constraints rather than flaws in the ToC logic. Overall, the programme’s experience affirms the ToC’s core idea that inclusive dialogue and capacity building can catalyse change, while also highlighting the importance of persistence, adaptability, and external enabling factors to fulfil the ultimate goals of women’s political empowerment.

4.2. Lessons Learnt

Several key lessons emerged from PoD’s implementation: First, building broad coalitions and partnerships greatly enhances impact – for instance, involving ambassadors in PoD activities added diplomatic weight and created new opportunities for women leaders (a best practice worth replicating). Second, working through internal party structures (like women’s leagues) proved effective in advancing women’s inclusion from within political institutions; supporting these insider reformers can yield changes (such as more women candidates) that outsider advocacy alone might not achieve. Third, a persistent challenge was the short time horizon of programming relative to the pace of social-political change. Meaningful trust-building and policy reform take longer than a few years, especially amid electoral upheavals and conflict – highlighting the need for continuous engagement beyond the project lifecycle. Lastly, the programme learned that empowering women and youth is necessary but not sufficient; without parallel commitment from male leaders and institutional buy-in, progress will stall. Future initiatives should therefore embed strategies to cultivate “champions” among established powerholders (e.g. progressive party leaders or male allies) to lock in and expand the gains made by women and youth participants. The programme considered this in factor in its approach of engaging with the political elites to influence them, but it was not at the necessary scale to trigger consistent changes.

4.3. Recommendations

Building on the endline findings and lessons learned, the following recommendations are proposed to strengthen future inclusion efforts in Mozambique (and similar contexts):

1. **Support Institutional Reforms for Gender Inclusion:** Advocate for and assist in the adoption of formal measures that entrench women’s political participation. This could include renewed support for passing a gender parity or “zebra list” electoral law or encouraging political parties to adopt internal quotas and transparent nomination rules. Future programmes should work closely with reform-minded legislators



and party leadership to revisit stalled legal reforms (such as the parity bill) and to promote voluntary charters or codes of conduct on gender inclusion within parties.

2. **Deepen and Broaden Women's Leadership Pipelines:** Continue investing in capacity-building for aspiring women (and youth) leaders, while enhancing support for them to transition into actual decision-making roles. This entails not just training, but also ongoing coaching, mentorship programmes, and networking opportunities linking graduates of initiatives like the Women's Political Academy to political parties, electoral candidates, and government institutions. Creating alumni networks and pairing emerging female leaders with senior mentors (including male allies) can help translate increased confidence and skills into concrete political appointments and electoral success. Special efforts should target young women, who face a double barrier to entry, ensuring that youth-focused leadership development is on par with the support given to women activists.
3. **Enhance Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue and Accountability Mechanisms:** Building trust between civic and political actors requires consistent, institutionalized dialogue platforms. It is recommended to formalize fora where political parties, civil society (women's groups, youth networks), and government representatives meet regularly to discuss inclusion goals and monitor progress. Incorporating independent observers (academia, media, or international partners) in these dialogues can further encourage transparency and trust. Over time, these institutionalized dialogues will normalize peaceful collaboration and help resolve disputes, mitigating the effects of political tensions on reform efforts.
4. **Adapt Strategies to Context and Safeguard Civic Space:** Future programmes must remain flexible and context-aware, particularly in environments prone to political upheaval or restrictions on civil society. Develop scenario plans to adjust activities during election periods or unrest – for instance, when formal engagement is not possible, pivot to behind-the-scenes facilitation or leverage international diplomatic channels (as PoD did by engaging embassies). Concurrently, prioritize advocacy for a more enabling environment for civic engagement: support coalitions that defend fundamental freedoms (expression, assembly) and push back against laws or practices that constrict civic space. By proactively addressing contextual risks and supporting civic freedoms, programmes can maintain momentum toward inclusion even amid adversity.
5. **Ensure Sustainability through Local Ownership and Resource Diversification:** To maintain the gains achieved and continue progressing, it is essential to strengthen the sustainability of local actors driving the women's inclusion agenda. IMD and its partners should develop a clear sustainability plan – exploring diversified funding streams, building income-generating activities, or integrating PoD initiatives into government and community structures where possible. Donors, even as a strategy to rationalize the increasingly scarce resources, should consider longer project cycles or follow-up phases to allow time for deeper institutional change and consolidation of results (acknowledging that transformative change extends beyond typical funding horizons). Supporting local civil society organizations in resource mobilization (a need identified during PoD exchanges) will reduce over-reliance on external funding and help these organizations continue acting as catalysts for change. In sum, future programming should prioritize local ownership of the change process – empowering Mozambican institutions and networks to carry the dialogue and inclusion work forward so that progress for women and youth in politics, once achieved, can also be sustained.



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